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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1982

G. CECIL HARTLEY, and
TRAVIS DELL,

Petitioners,

vs.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

ARNOLD D. LEVINE, ESQ.
LEVINE, FREEDMAN, HIRSCH
& LEVINSON, P.A.
725 E. Kennedy Blvd.
Tampa, Florida 33602
813/229-6585

Attorneys for Petitioners
G. Cecil Hartley and Travis Dell

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. The test to be applied in and remedies available to defendants in criminal cases where the government is responsible for the mishandling, loss and/or destruction of evidence are in conflict among the first, second, third, fifth, ninth, eleventh and D.C. circuits.

2. What is the proper test to protect defendants' right to a fair trial and fundamental fairnes when the government deliberately mishandles material evidence likely to be exculpatory, depriving the defendants of the opportunity to test that evidence for the characteristics that are the alleged fraud and conspiracy for which said defendants had been indicted?

3. What is the proper test to protect the defendants' right to fundamental fairness where the government, in attempting to prove its allegations that it was defrauded by the defendants' sale of defective products to it, tests only a limited quantity of the product, destroys the tested sample in the process, and then deliberately destroys the remainder of the product in its possession, thereby depriving the defendants of an opportunity to independently test any of the product?

4. Does the circuit court test in *Hartley* sufficiently recognize and protect the constitutional rights of a defendant where the government has mishandled material evidence that is likely to be exculpatory thereby depriving the defendants of the opportunity to test the evidence for the characteristics alleged in the indictment to constitute the elements of the frauds and conspiracy charged?

5. There is a significant argument that the Eleventh Circuit test in *Hartley* fails to recognize the due process implications of the destruction and mishandling of evidence that is potentially exculpatory.

6. Does the test in *Hartley* recognize and protect a defendant's rights to due process of law when the government has destroyed and mishandled potentially exculpatory evidence, thereby precluding the defendants from independently testing the evidence for the characteristics alleged in the indictment to constitute the elements of the frauds and conspiracy charged?

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PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

OPINION BELOW

On June 17, 1982, the Court of Appeals entered judgment affirming the convictions of petitioners herein. *United States of America v. G. Cecil Hartley, et al.*, 678 F.2d 961 (11th Cir. 1982). A copy of the opinion is attached to the appendix of co-defendant Treasure Isle, Inc., which defendant is in the process of petitioning this Court to issue a writ of certiorari. An order denying a Petition For Rehearing And For Suggestion For Rehearing En Banc was entered September 8, 1982. A copy of the order appears in the Appendix. (A).

JOINDER IN CO-DEFENDANT'S PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioners herein, G. Cecil Hartley and Travis Dell, were indicted with co-defendant Treasure Isle, Inc., and are parties who are jointly and severally interested in the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals entered June 17, 1982 affirming the convictions of each of the defendants, and the order of that court denying the co defendant Treasure Isle's Petition For Rehearing And Suggestion For En Banc consideration dated September 8, 1982. Petitioners herein, in accordance with Rule 19.4, *Supreme Court Rules,* do hereby join in the petition for writ of certiorari of co-defendant Treasure Isle, Inc. to review the aforesaid judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit was entered on June 17, 1982, affirming Petitioners' convictions herein. A timely Petition For Rehearing And En Banc Consideration was filed. The Order Denying the Petition is dated September 8, 1982. This Petition is filed within sixty days of that decision and is therefore timely filed.

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The fundamental right to a fair trial in the United States is implicit in Article III Section 2(3) of the United States Constitution, and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

United States Constitution, Amendment V:

> No person . . . shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.

United States Constitution, Amendment VI:

> In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, . . . and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On August 8, 1979, a federal grand jury returned a 33-count indictment naming Treasure Isle, Inc., Mr. Hartley, Dell, and Patterson as Co-Defendants (XCV II 1-15)*

The Defendants proceeded to trial before a jury in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida on an indictment which alleged a scheme to defraud the United States through the use of the mails, a conspiracy to defraud the United States, interstate transportation of money obtained by fraud, and a RICO violation. The Defendants Hartley, Dell and Treasure Isle, were all convicted of the 33 counts; the Defendant Patterson was acquitted.

Treasure Isle, Inc., is a publicly-held Florida corporation which has been in existence since the early 1950's. Treasure

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*"Record on Appeal" and the "Supplemental Record on Appeal" are consecutively numbered in Roman Numerals from I through CVIII. The transcripts are paginated in the upper right-hand corner in Arabic Numerals. The exhibits introduced as evidence at the Pre-Trial hearings and at the trial will be referred to by "Ex" preceded by the initial of the party introducing the exhibit and followed by the identification number or letter utilized by the trial court clerk.

Isle produces frozen breaded seafood products, primarily shrimp, which are sold throughout the United States. During the time period pertinent to this case its average annual revenue was 37.95 million dollars (T.I. EX. 1L), and a small portion of this revenue came from the sale of frozen breaded shrimp to the United States Department of Defense for consumption by military personnel (TI. Ex. 1L, 61A). The company's production of frozen breaded shrimp for consumption by the military provided the basis for the 33-count indictment. Petitioner Hartley at all material times served as one of Treasure Isle's vice presidents and its production manager, and Mr. Dell was the plant superintendent in charge of the day-to-day production activities of Treasure Isle. (LVIII, p.6194-96, p.6200-6202, p. 6235-38).

Reduced to its simplest form, the Government alleged in the indictment that Treasure Isle and Petitioners agreed among themselves to defraud the Defense Department by submitting false claims to the Government in connection with the sale of frozen breaded shrimp that allegedly did not conform to contract requirements. The Government contract contained a detailed list of criteria to be used for inspection purposes by the Government. That criteria included the presence of foreign matter, dehydrated areas, the existence of black spots greater than one-eighth inch, texture, color, size, weight and percentage of breading.

Although Treasure Isle entered into hundreds of contracts with the Defense Department for frozen breaded shrimp between 1970 and 1978 (TI Ex. 51), the substantive counts of the indictment focused upon but 14 of those contracts.

Generally, the process for breading shrimp entails first cleaning, pealing, splitting and deveining the shrimp. The

processed shrimp are coated with meal, batter, breading, and then frozen.

After a day and one-half of deliberations, the jury sent a note to the trial judge stating that it was *"hopelessly deadlocked"* and could not reach a verdict (LXXVI, p. 7964). The note further explained that a portion of the jury *"rejects all prosecution testimony as untrue"* and *"a fabric of lies"* (emphasis added) (LXXVI, p. 7964). The trial court then gave a supplemental instruction to the jury in which he asked the minority and majority to re-examine their respective judgments in order to arrive at a unanimous verdict. The next afternoon, after three days of deliberation, the jury returned guilty verdicts on all 33 counts as to Treasure Isle, Mr. Hartley and Mr. Dell.

The factual predicate for the issues raised herein begins some time in 1976, when the U.S., through Mr. Kirkgessner of the Defense Investigative Services, Department of Defense, conducted a criminal investigation of the activities of Petitioners and Treasure Isle, Inc., (hereinafter referred to as T.I.). The investigation was to determine whether any of the Petitioners committed any criminal acts in connection with T.I.'s production and delivery of frozen breaded shrimp to the United States (Vol. CIII, p. 1866). T.I. sold and delivered to the U.S. frozen breaded shrimp from 1960 through 1979. (Vol. CI, p. 1126).

In May, 1979, the Defendant, T.I. and Petitioners learned for the first time, that they were the object of a criminal investigation by the U.S. concerning the Company's compliance with specifications contained in contracts between the Company and the Government.

Counsel for petitioners contacted the Department of Justice in order to determine the nature and extent of the investigation by the Government. In response to that inquiry the Department refused to discuss the then pending investigation except to state that it was criminal in nature and was being considered by a Federal Grand Jury.

By letter dated June 6, 1979 ("G" attached to Hartley's Motion in Limine to Limit Government's Proof, to Dismiss and to Suppress), Mr. Levine requested that *all product sold by T.I. to the U.S. from June 10, 1978 through May 16, 1979, be preserved in order to permit independent testing and examination of the product still in the hands of the Government.* On June 25, Mr. Levine forwarded a follow-up letter ("H" attached to Hartley's Motion) and the U.S. replied by two letters dated July 22. ("H" and "I").

The indictment was not returned until August 8, 1979, more than a year and one-half after the Government testing of the T.I. product. (Vol. XCVII, p. 1).

On December 13, 1979, the Government filed a response to Treasure Isle's Motion to Dismiss Due to Non-Compliance with Magistrate's October 10, 1979, Order ("B" attached to Hartley's Motion). In its pertinent part, the response stated that:

> "In December, 1977, when Government inspectors assigned to Treasure Isle became aware that their samples of frozen breaded shrimp were being tampered with, certain measures were undertaken to verify this fact. When verification was confirmed, the inspectors identified two lots that had been subjected to sample tampering: F6869 and F7008. The contract that these two lots were shipped out on (DS-135-78-C 5150; C 5158) were placed on hold at the three designation points. An examination was conducted of the 529 cases

> comprising the two lots in question. A few cases that had specified markings upon them were identified and seized as evidence. Certain boxes within various cases were also found to contain special markings that were significant; they were also seized as evidence and segregated. The balance of the shipment was subjected to a quality audit to determine conformance with contractual specifications. To effectuate such an audit, random samples of the boxes were selected and their contents tested. *The shrimp that was subjected to such testing are consumed;* consequently, a quality audit results in a slight reduction of the total quantity of shrimp. The results of the audit revealed the shrimp to be grossly nonconforming: this indictment followed." (Emphasis added)

The audits (test results) referred to were received by Mr. Hartley after the indictment was returned. The initial audit and report is dated January 19, 1978, *some 16 months prior to any Petitioner having any knowledge of the investigation.* (Exhibit "C" attached to Hartley's Motion).

In addition to the aforesaid test results, additional testing was done by the Government and all of those test reports were presented in evidence before the Court in connection with the evidentiary hearing on the pending Motions.

The Government conscientiously and systematically destroyed (consumed) all product sold to it by T.I. except for a very limited quantity of product that failed the Government tests. (Vol. 1, p.37-94). *Except for the limited quantity of non-conforming product preserved by the Government, no other product was retained by the Government that the Defendants could test in order to*

establish that the product conformed to the contract requirements.

Except for the testimony of the Government auditors regarding the limited quantity of shrimp that came into their possession for the purpose of testing, which was an infinitesimal amount of the product sold by T.I. to the Government, no Government witness ever testified that *any specific product lot or any specific contract sold to the Government did not conform to the contract specifications.* ("Only a relatively small amount of shrimp purchased by the Government from Treasure Isle is still in existence and available for inspection and testing by the Defendants in the case." Excerpt from Court Order June 11, 1980, (Vol. C III, p. 1865, App. B) (Only several hundred pounds were tested out of 3,000,000 pounds of shrimp sold.) The former T.I. employees who testified as Government witnesses spoke only in generalities regarding in-plant irregularities during the period described in the indictment.

To counter and rebut both the Government auditors' testimony and the testimony of the former T.I. employees, Petitioners tried to present the product itself as the best evidence of its quality. However, no product was available because the Government's mishandling of the product it had preserved and thereby prevented its testing for the characteristics that the Government claimed evidenced the fraud perpetrated on it.

To the extent Petitioners were able to obtain from the *Government* files and records test results that contradicted the testimony of the Government's witnesses, it presented that evidence. *One example of the true quality of the T.I. product is found in the Jacksonville audit reports of Contract C-5112, done in January and April, 1979.*

The product described in Contract C-5112 was delivered to the Government on or about January 2, 1979. The product was tested and audited by the Government and the report of that audit is on U.S. Department of Commerce Form 89-822 and is dated *April 3, 1979* (Vol. IV, p. 374-392). The report and each attachment thereto shows that, based on the testing done by Government employees at a Government facility, in the presence of D.I.S. (Criminal Investigators) at Jacksonville, Florida, at a point in time that the product was in the exclusive custody of the Government, *the product, in every respect, satisfied the contract specifications as set out in the contract between the Government and T.I.* On January 3, 1979, Contract C-5112 was tested for the *first time* at Jacksonville, Florida, (after the product had left T.I. and was in the exclusive custody of the Government), which tests were performed by agents and employees of the U.S. The January test results established that the product, in every respect, satisfied each aspect of the contract specifications. (Vol. IV, p. 374-392). *The product described in contract C-5112 was shipped from T.I. to the Government before any of the Defendants had any knowledge of the criminal investigation.*

By virtue of the fact, that on the date of the indictment, (1) in excess of 99.9% of the product that was sold was no longer available for testing (the Government had consumed the product. In spite of the June 6, 1979 demand to preserve a random sample of the product for independent testing by the potential defendants); and (2) *due to the Government's mishandling of the product that was retained, the product could not be tested* for all of the attributes called for by the contract between the parties *that was identified* in the indictment as representing fraudulent conduct on the part of the Defendants, the Petitioners were denied the fundamental fairness guaranteed to them

by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.

In the order of the Court denying the Petitioner's Motion to Dismiss, Suppress and In Limine (which order was entered just prior to closing argument), the Court made the following findings of fact. (App. B):

> "In January, 1978, military inspectors at the Treasure Isle plant attempted to verify their suspicion that the inspection process was being subverted by employees of Treasure Isle. Certain steps were taken toward this end in connection with production lot nos. F6968 and F7008. After the inspectors' suspicions were verified to their satisfaction, the inspectors notified their superiors as to what they had found. Thereafter, the shrimp which was produced under these two production lots were shipped to various destinations pursuant to three separate Government contracts. The last four digits of these contracts were 5168, 5150, and 5153. Orders were given to place the shrimp from these lot numbers on hold for later testing. On two occasions during the early part of 1978, shrimp from these lot numbers were tested for compliance to Government specifications. A substantial portion of these lots were preserved and have been made available to the Defendants for testing. *However, due to subsequent thawing and refreezing, and normal deterioration, the shrimp from these two lots cannot be tested for some of the characteristics which are pertinent to this case, such as breading percentage and count per pound. All other shrimp produced by Treasure Isle and sold to the United States Government has been consumed, or, in the words of the Defendants in this case, systematically destroyed."* (Emphasis added)

As it relates to the significance of the unavailability of the shrimp for testing, the Court in its Order, found that:

> "The Court must agree with the Petitioners in this case that *the missing shrimp is both material and subject to varying expert opinion.* While the consumption of the shrimp was 'intentional', there is no evidence that there was an improper governmental motive in this case. The advisability of the continuing purchases of shrimp from Treasure Isle after January, 1978, may be questioned, however, once that shrimp was purchased, it was not unreasonable for it to be consumed. *The Government has stated no intention of introducing any results of tests performed on shrimp that was later consumed."* (Emphasis added)

The Court concluded that, although Petitioners were denied any potential benefits from the testing that they may have performed, so too was the Government deprived of test results which may have been beneficial to its case. Accordingly, the Court then denied Petitioners' Motions. (Vol. CIII, p.1864-71). During the trial, the limited quantity of non-conforming product that the Government preserved, together with the test results for that product from Lots F6968 and Lots F7008, were admitted in evidence before the jury. It was based solely upon the testimony describing the results of the testing of these two lots by Sgt. Jackson in January 1978 (Vol. XXXiX, pp. 4306, 4313-42) by Sgt. Baily in March 1978 (Vol. XL, pp. 4427-75, Vol. SLI, p. 4496-4536) and Sgt. Reimers in February and March of 1978 (G. Exs. 17A, 17B, 17C) (Vol. XXXVI, pp. 3971-74, 3998-4052) that the Government attempted to establish the allegations in the indictment by "independent evidence." The Government contended this "independent evidence" corroborated the vague and general testimonial evidence of the former T.I.

employees. Without this "independent evidence," the Government could not have prevailed in this case.

If the Government had not destroyed (consumed) and had it properly preserved (not mishandled) the product on hand *after* it had determined that there was probable cause to believe a crime had been committed and that Petitioners were participants therein, *then the Petitioners through impartial testing would have had "independent evidence" to present to the jury and thereby raise a reasonable doubt as to their guilt of the charges.*

The destruction (consumption) and mishandling of the product is particularly material when one considers what occurred during the course of the deliberation of the jurors. After a day and one-half of deliberations, the jury sent a note to the trial judge stating that it was "hopelessly deadlocked" and could not reach a verdict (Vol. LXXVI, p. 7964). The note further explained that a portion of the jury *"rejects all prosecution testimony as untrue"* and *"a fabric of lies."* (Emphasis added) (Vol. LXXVI, p. 7964). The judge then gave the jury supplemental instructions and the following afternoon, after three days of deliberation, the jury returned guilty verdicts on all 33 counts set out in the indictment.

The Government, through the witness Reimers, presented evidence that certain product was nonconforming and presented photographs of product tested by him that were a part of production Lots F6968 and F7008. (G. Exh. 17A, 17B, 17C). *Reimers also testified that the photos and test results of the samples were representative of the entire lot* (Vol. XXXVII, p. 4063-65). Although these lots were kept and not consumed, they were not properly preserved by the Government and, as a result, *could not* be used for testing by T.I. or any independent examiner. (See testimony of Dr. Rao and of the

Chief U.S.D.C. Inspector, Vol. LXIV, p. 6831-6878, and Vol. II, p. 130-223).

Although the Government's counsel, in cavalier fashion, advised the Court that it had *no* intention of introducing *any* results of tests performed on shrimp that were *later consumed,* (which statement of intent was accepted by the Court and formed a basis for its denial of the Petitioners' Motion), the Government, *as a matter of fact, did* offer evidence of product that was tested and later consumed. Sgt. Davis, a most important Government witness, testified that in connection with his employment as a Government inspector at T.I., he would test the product, and he would prepare worksheets to show the results of these tests. He stated that on his own he would change worksheets for product that he had inspected and rejected in order to show that the product conformed to the contract and passed inspection (Vol. XXX, p. 3272-80). Airman Sims, called as a witness by the Government, in substance, testified to the same facts as did Sgt. Davis. (Vol. SLV, p. 4944-4950). *All of the product about which Sims and Davis testified was consumed and unavailable for testing by T.I.*

The product that was tested by the Government auditors that was part of the contracts containing production Lots F6968 and F7008 that *passed* inspection was *consumed* by the Government *after* January, 1978 (Vol. 1, p. 37-94). The *"non-conforming"* product in this contract *was preserved.* The "conforming" product was unavailable for presentation before the jury. At first blush one would think that the availability of favorable tests results and unavailability of the product would be beneficial to Petitioners. This was not true in this case. Since there was no "conforming" product available to present to the jury or to have independently inspected, the Defendants were *forced* to rely on the test results obtained by Government inspec-

tors. When the Government examined Sgt. Dillman and Mr. Halladay, a civilian employee, who acted as Government auditors, and whose test results showed that the product conformed to the contract, the Government attempted to establish the lack of qualification of these Government auditors to test the product and thereby put in question the validity of the Government's test results that were *favorable* to the Defendants. (Vol. SLIX, p. 5240-44, 5264-67).

Additionally, the Government urged the jury to disregard these favorable (conforming) test results during its closing argument claiming that the Government inspectors who obtained these results were unqualified. (Vol. LXXV, pp. 7756-58, 7761, 7766-67, 7775).

In light of the fact that the Government consumed the product after it had actual knowledge that the in-plant inspection process had been subverted, it is fundamentally unfair for the Government to: (a) only test three separate contracts; (b) preserve the non-conforming product in a manner that precludes verification of the product's nonconformance by independent testing; (c) photograph the product that was tested and determined to be nonconforming before it was mishandled by the Government and have these photos presented to the jury; (d) consume the conforming product, and (e) attack, during the proceedings and in closing argument, the qualifications of the Government employees who determined the product did conform and who were the only "independent witnesses" that were available to Petitioners to establish their innocence.

The Petitioners submit that the error is of a constitutional dimension and requires reversal of the convictions.

The Defendants were placed on the horns of a dilemma by virtue of the actions of the Government. On the one

hand, Defendants attacked the expertise and credibility of the Government testers who found the product nonconforming; on the other hand, since the Defendants could not independently test the product, they had to defend the expertise and credibility of the Government testers whose test results showed conformance with the contract when the Government attacked their qualifications.

If any of the product had been: (1) properly preserved by the Government; (2) not mishandled by the Government; (3) not consumed by the Government and available for defense experts to tests; the Defendants would not have been presented with this Hobson's choice and, as evidenced by the attitude of jurors as expressed in the note to the judge, the jury never would have convicted the Defendants.

Except for the few favorable government test results (hereinabove referred to), the Defendants had no effective way of contesting by *tangible or independent evidence* the Government's presentation. All of the test results are subjective. This fact is demonstrated clearly by a careful consideration of the government audits of F6968 and F7008. These production lots were "audited" by testing by at least five different military inspectors acting independently of each other on six different occasions. (Pennington inspection TI Exh. Z 56) (Dillman & Halladay inspections TI Exh. Z 57) (Erickson inspection TI Exh. 17) (Baily inspection Vol. XL, p. 4439-75, Vol. XLI, p. 4479-4564, Vol. XLII, p. 4569-4595). *Although the production lots were all the same* (produced on the same day, in the same manner, from the same shrimp) *the test results differed greatly. The Government was able to test and retest the shrimp until they obtained the results they desired for prosecution, but the Government's conduct deprived the Defendants of a similar opportunity.*

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I. THE TEST TO BE APPLIED IN AND REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO DEFENDANTS IN CRIMINAL CASES WHERE THE GOVERNMENT IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MISHANDLING, LOSS AND/OR DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE ARE IN CONFLICT AMONG THE FIRST, SECOND, THIRD, FIFTH, NINTH, ELEVENTH AND D.C. CIRCUITS.

II. WHAT IS THE PROPER TEST TO PROTECT DEFENDANTS' RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL AND FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS WHEN THE GOVERNMENT DELIBERATELY MISHANDLES MATERIAL EVIDENCE LIKELY TO BE EXCULPATORY, DEPRIVING THE DEFENDANTS OF THE OPPORTUNITY TO TEST THAT EVIDENCE FOR THE CHARACTERISTICS THAT ARE THE ALLEGED FRAUD AND CONSPIRACY FOR WHICH SAID DEFENDANTS HAD BEEN INDICTED?

III. WHAT IS THE PROPER TEST TO PROTECT DEFENDANTS' RIGHT TO FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS WHERE THE GOVERNMENT, IN ATTEMPTING TO PROVE ITS ALLEGATIONS THAT IT WAS DEFRAUDED BY THE DEFENDANTS' SALE OF DEFECTIVE PRODUCTS TO IT, TESTS ONLY A LIMITED QUANTITY OF THE PRODUCT, DESTROYS THE TESTED SAMPLE IN THE PROCESS, AND THEN DELIBERATELY DESTROYS THE REMAINDER OF THE PRODUCT IN ITS POSSESSION, THEREBY DEPRIVING THE DEFENDANTS OF AN OPPORTUNITY TO INDEPENDENTLY TEST ANY OF THE PRODUCT?

FIRST CIRCUIT

The test applied in this circuit is three-pronged: "(F)irst, was the evidence material to the question of guilt or the degree of punishment; Second, was the defendant prejudiced by its destruction, and Third, was the Government acting in good faith when it destroyed the evidence."

United States v. Picariello, 568 F.2d 222, 227 (1st Cir. 1978). The First Circuit rule would put *the burden of showing good faith on the Government rather than on the Defendant.*

Unlike the Eleventh Circuit's *Hartley* test, the First Circuit test does not call for any "weighing" of factors and does not require the defendant to establish an "improper Government motive". The circuit squarely places the burden of showing good faith on the Government rather than on the defendant. In the First Circuit the District Court's order denying the motion to dismiss and to suppress in *Hartley* would have been overturned.

SECOND CIRCUIT

Two distinct tests are applied in this circuit. Where evidence has been lost or suppressed, the culpability of the Government is weighed against the amount of prejudice to the defendant. *United States v. Miranda,* 526 F.2d 1319 (2d Cir. 1975). In any instance where the matter is considered by an appellate court after a conviction, the court will analyze the extent of prejudice to the defendant by virtue of the loss or destruction against the extent of evidence of guilt adduced at the trial in order to determine the prejudice, if any, to the defendant.

Where evidence is destroyed in the Second Circuit, *"sanctions will normally follow, irrespective of the perpetrator's motivation, unless the Government can bear the heavy burden of demonstrating that no prejudice resulted to the defendant." United States v. Bufalino,* 576 F.2d 446 (2d Cir. 1978). Clearly, under these tests, the District Court's order denying the motion to dismiss and to suppress in *Hartley* would be overturned.

THIRD CIRCUIT

This circuit adopts the holding of *United States v. Bryant,* 439 F.2d 642 (U.S.D.C. 1971) that "convictions may be permitted to stand only 'so long as the Government has made *"earnest efforts"* to preserve crucial materials . . ." and where the Government showed that the loss was *"harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Government of Virgin Islands v. Testamark,* 570 F.2d 1162, 1165, 1167 (3d Cir. 1978).

In footnote 7 of *Testamark,* at 1166, the Court cites Second, Fifth and Ninth Circuit cases all as progeny of the *Bryant* case. Before the Ninth Circuit's en banc opinion in *Loudhawk,* the Panel Opinion was cited as the most recent example of this trend. Under this test, the District Court's order denying the motion to dismiss and to suppress in *Hartley* would be overturned.

FIFTH CIRCUIT

The Fifth Circuit clearly follows the propositions of law found in *United States v. Bryant, supra.* In *Armstrong v. Collier,* 536 F.2d 72 (5th Cir. 1976), the Court, in a habeas corpus proceeding instituted by a defendant who had been charged with state offenses, held that: (P 78)

> Perhaps the leading authority in this area is *United States v. Bryant,* 132 U.S. App. D.C. 142, 439 F.2d 642 (1971). The issue, as the Court defined it was *"whether intentional non-preservation by investigators* . . . of discoverable evidence amounts to its illegal suppression." Id. at 644. A tape was 'absolutely crucial to the question of appellants' guilt or innocence,' Id. at 648, had been misplaced. The record indicated that the investigators *'made no effort to preserve' the*

tape, Id. at 646 . . ., and the Court found 'at the very least a hint of bad faith . . .' Id. at 647. Examining the issues in the context of the *Jencks Act, Brady* and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Court concluded that good faith would excuse loss of evidence, but cautioned:

> *'An exception for good faith loss of important evidence must not be allowed to swallow the discovery rules, and the burden of explanation of the Government must be a heavy one;* but criminal convictions otherwise based on sufficient evidence may be permitted to stand so long as the Government made 'earnest effort' to preserve crucial materials and to find them once a discovery request is made.'" (Emphasis added)

The right to test critical evidence is a constitutional right. *White v. Maggio,* 556 F.2d 1352 (5th Cir. 1977).

The Government never satisfied the "earnest effort" and/or "good faith" test of the Fifth Circuit and in that Circuit Petitioners' convictions would have been overturned.

NINTH CIRCUIT

The Ninth Circuit adopted an ad hoc approach to destruction of evidence cases until *United States v. Heiden,* 508 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1974), where it announced the rule that, where evidence has been lost or destroyed, the conviction will be overturned *if the defendant* can show "(1) Bad faith or connivance on the part of the Government, (2) that he was prejudiced by the loss of evidence." At 902.

In the vacated panel decision 628 F.2d 1139 (9th Cir. 1979) (en banc) in *United States v. Hawk,* (original Opinion is unpublished) (vacated on other grounds), the majority's reasoning was similar to that of the D.C. Circuit:

> "A presumption of prejudice in favor of the Appellees is the only means available to protect them from the unfairness that inheres in the Government's unilateral choice in placing that evidence completely beyond the appellees' and the Court's reach."

Thus, the panel kept *Heiden, supra,* intact, but held that where *the Government could offer no good excuse* for its good faith actions *and its destruction of evidence precluded the defense from proving prejudice by examining the material destroyed, the burden of proof would shift to the Government to show a lack of prejudice.* The dissent in the *en banc* opinion points out:

> "The majority opinion correctly recognizes that we are pursuing separate and distinct interest in situations of this kind: deterring Governmental misconduct, protecting a Defendant's right to a fair trial, and preserving the integrity of the judicial process. None of these interests is appropriately protected by balancing one of these interests against the other. Each of the interests is independently important, and none of them can be weighed against the others. Thus, for example, we have no interest whatever in injuring a Defendant's right to a fair trial to reward Governmental innocence in destroying evidence."

In the Ninth Circuit Petitioners' convictions would have been vacated.

D.C. CIRCUIT

The D.C. Circuit's leading cases are *United States v. Bryant,* 439 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971) and *United States v. Bryant,* 448 F.2d 1182 (D.C. Cir. 1971). The *Bryant* cases commanded a "pragmatic balancing approach" where the District Court is directed to:

> ". . . weigh the degree of negligence or bad faith involved, the importance of the evidence lost, and the evidence of guilt adduced at trial in order to come to a determination that would serve the ends of justice." 448 F.2d at 1183.

The D.C. Circuit sees *Bryant's "good faith exception" applying only in circumstances where there are "rigorous and systematic procedures designed to preserve all discoverable evidence." United States v. Butler,* 499 F.2d 1006, 1008 (D.C. Cir. 1974). *See also United States v. Harrison,* 524 F.2d 421 (D.C. Cir. 1975).

Further, the D.C. Circuit does not require a showing of actual prejudice, but a "significant probability of prejudice," which "might have led the jury to entertain a reasonable doubt about (Defendant's) guilt." *United States v. Butler, supra.* The D.C. Circuit has not required a showing of actual prejudice in order for the defendant to obtain relief.

The D.C. Circuit also views the destruction or loss of potentially exculpatory material as a due process violation in and of itself. *United States v. Quivers,* 539 F.2d 744 (D.C. Cir. 1976).

Since there was was a significant probability that Petitioners were prejudiced by the mishandling and destruction of the evidence, which, under the circumstances of this case might have led the jury to entertain a reasonable doubt as to Petitioners' guilt, in the D.C. Circuit Petitioners' convictions would have been set aside.

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

The panel opinion of the Eleventh Circuit which is a basis for this petition for writ of certiorari, on page 1677 held that:

> "the Fifth Circuit has developed a 'bad faith' test. Absent an indication of 'improper Government motive,' the Court has consistently refused to find a Due Process violation sufficient to warrant reversal." *Armstrong v. Collier, supra.*

Contrary to the aforesaid quotation from the Panel Opinion, neither the Fifth Circuit nor any other circuit has required the defendant to prove the Government's bad faith. The Fifth Circuit has adopted the test in the D.C. Circuit, as set forth in *U.S. v. Bryant, supra,* which imposes on the Government a burden of good faith and a responsibility to make an earnest effort to preserve the evidence, neither of which requirements of law were satisfied in the proceedings below.

In *Hartley,* the Eleventh Circuit has announced *a new test, unlike that of any other circuit,* that requires the defendant to prove the Government's "bad faith" and its "improper motive." In *Hartley,* the Court has inexplicably required the defendant to come up with proof that the Government itself has destroyed and mishandled and has shifted the burden of proof to the defendant which under the circumstances of this case, is inconsistent with the presumption of innocence afforded all defendants in criminal prosecutions and is therefore unconstitutional.

SUPREME COURT

All of the circuits dealing with the destruction, loss or mishandling of evidence recognize that any test devised must be created in light of a defendant's constitutional due process rights. In *Brady v. Maryland,* 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194 (1963) this Court held that:

> "The suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either

to guilt or punishment, *irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.*" (Emphasis added.)

The aforesaid precedent established by this Court requires reversal of Petitioners' convictions.

LAW REVIEW ARTICLES

Two recent Law Review comments regarding the loss and/or destruction of evidence fully support the Petitioners' contentions that the trial court and the Eleventh Circuit erred. *Judicial Response to Governmental Loss or Destruction of Evidence,* 39 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 542, (1971-72); *The Right to Independent Testing: A New Hitch in the Preservation of Evidence Doctrine.* 75 Colum. L. Rev. 1355 (1975).

It must be remembered that, not only did the Government destroy evidence, it also failed to keep the small amount it preserved in a condition that allowed it to be independently tested.

As is clear from the above, the circuits are widely split as to the proper test to be applied in destruction and mishandled evidence cases — What factors should be considered? Should they be weighed, or not? Is the Government's good faith or bad faith of any significance when the destroyed and/or mishandled evidence is potentially exculpatory? Which side has a burden on which issue?

Because of the importance of the issue herein to the administration of criminal law throughout the district courts arising from the frequency with which the issue is continuously addressed, it is most important that this Court clearly resolve the divergence of opinions and set the standard for destruction and mishandled evidence cases that will not permit the abuses that the record in this case shows was imposed upon petitioners.

IV. DOES THE CIRCUIT COURT TEST IN *HARTLEY* SUFFICIENTLY RECOGNIZE AND PROTECT THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF DEFENDANTS WHERE THE GOVERNMENT HAS MISHANDLED MATERIAL EVIDENCE THAT IS LIKELY TO BE EXCULPATORY THEREBY DEPRIVING THE DEFENDANTS OF THE OPPORTUNITY TO TEST THE EVIDENCE FOR THE CHARACTERISTICS ALLEGED IN THE INDICTMENT TO CONSTITUTE THE ELEMENTS OF THE FRAUDS AND CONSPIRACY CHARGED?

V. THERE IS A SIGNIFICANT ARGUMENT THAT THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT TEST IN *HARTLEY* FAILS TO RECOGNIZE THE DUE PROCESS IMPLICATIONS OF THE DESTRUCTION AND MISHANDLING OF EVIDENCE THAT IS POTENTIALLY EXCULPATORY.

VI. DOES THE TEST IN *HARTLEY* RECOGNIZE AND PROTECT DEFENDANTS' RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW WHEN THE GOVERNMENT HAS DESTROYED AND MISHANDLED POTENTIALLY EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE, THEREBY PRECLUDING THE DEFENDANT FROM INDEPENDENTLY TESTING THE EVIDENCE FOR THE CHARACTERISTICS ALLEGED IN THE INDICTMENT TO CONSTITUTE THE ELEMENTS OF THE FRAUDS AND CONSPIRACY CHARGED?

In the Eleventh Circuit *Hartley* opinion there appears no understanding that when material and potentially exculpatory evidence is either destroyed or mishandled there may be both a statutory violation and a violation of the Defendants' rights under the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. Cases on destruction of evidence, even in the Fifth Circuit, recognize that any test devised must be created in the light of *Brady v. Maryland*, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) because "it must be

remembered that *Brady* is a constitutional mandate." *United States v. Beasley,* 576 F.2d 626, 630 (5th Cir., 1978). As the Seventh Circuit pointed out: "[a] defendant's right to prepare the best defense he can and to bring to the Court's attention any evidence helpful to this case is constitutionally protected." The Supreme Court in *Brady v. Maryland, supra,* recognized the right of a defendant to have access to exculpatory evidence in the hands of a prosecutor. We believe a defendant also has the right to preserve possibly exculpatory evidence and that, to the extent the Government or its agents frustrate such preservation, the defendant has a constitutional claim." *McDonald v. State of Illinois,* 557 F.2d 596, 603 (7th Cir. 1977).

Unlike all other circuits that have considered this issue, the Eleventh Circuit fails to see that defendants' due process rights cannot be ignored merely because the defendants have been unable to prove that the Government has acted in bad faith.

Perhaps it is proper to consider factors about the quality of Government conduct in fashioning a sanction for a violation of defendants' due process rights, but such factors should not be permitted to poison an analysis of whether the defense has been denied an opportunity to bring to the jury's attention evidence that may be exculpatory.

A defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial is not a mere "interest" to be weighed, but a right to be protected.

The Eleventh Circuit test in *Hartley* fails to see the constitutional implications of destruction and mishandling of material and/or essentially exculpatory evidence, it prejudices and, in fact, ignores a defendant's Fifth Amendment rights to due process and, as such, should be scrutinized by this Court.

CONCLUSION

The opinion of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals placed an unrealistic and impossible burden on Petitioners in this criminal case to demonstrate prejudice, improper Government motive, and bad faith where the Government intentionally destroyed and mishandled relevant and material evidence. This is an unconstitutional and illogical placement of the burden of proof. There are substantial disagreements among the various circuits as to what standard should be applied. Such a fundamental issue should not be allowed to remain unresolved among the circuits. For this reason, this Court should accept certiorari in this case to resolve the conflict between the circuits and clarify the Eleventh Circuit's "bad faith test" and "improper Government motive test" in light of the tests pronounced in the other appellate circuits, and also to resolve the issue of who has the burden of going forward with the evidence of prejudice, good faith, bad faith, motive and negligence in a destruction and/or mishandling of evidence case.

Respectfully submitted,

LEVINE, FREEDMAN, HIRSCH & LEVINSON, PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION

BY:_____

ARNOLD D. LEVINE, ESQ.
725 E. Kennedy Blvd.
Tampa, Florida 33602
813/229-6585

Attorneys for Petitioners

APPENDIX A

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 80-5572

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

G. CECIL HARTLEY, TRAVIS DELL
and TREASURE ISLE, INC.,
Defendants-Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

ON PETITIONS FOR REHEARING AND SUGGESTIONS FOR REHEARING EN BANC
(Opinion June 17, 1982, 11 Cir., 198____, _____F.2d _____).

(SEP 8 1982)

Before GODBOLD, Chief Judge; HILL and FAY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM

(✓) The Petitions for Rehearing are DENIED and no member of this panel nor Judge in regular active service on the Court having requested that the Court be polled on rehearing en banc (Rule 35, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure; Eleventh Circuit Rule 26), the Suggestions for Rehearing En Banc are also DENIED.

( ) The Petitions for Rehearing are DENIED and the Court having been polled at the request of one of the members of the Court and a majority of the Circuit Judges who are in regular active service not having voted in favor of it (Rule 35, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure; Eleventh Circuit Rule 26), the Suggestions for Rehearing En Banc are also DENIED.

( ) A member of the Court in active service having requested a poll on the reconsideration of this cause en banc, and a majority of the judges in active service not having voted in favor of it, rehearing en banc is DENIED.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT:

/s/ Peter T. Fay
United States District Judge

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

vs. Case No. 79-69-Cr-T-GC

G. CECIL HARTLEY, TRAVIS DELL,
ROBERT L. (PAT) PATERSON, and
TREASURE ISLE, INC.

ORDER

I

The Defendants in this case are charged in a 33 count Indictment, Count I of which charges conspiracy to defraud the United States of America in connection with procurement by the Department of Defense of frozen breaded shrimp from the Defendant Treasure Isle, Inc. Paragraph 12 of the Indictment states:

> It was part of said conspiracy that the Defendants would supply and cause to be supplied in connection with military procurement contracts with the Department of Defense, shrimp that did not conform to contract requirements, to wit:
> (a) Shrimp that were smaller than represented;
> (b) Shrimp that were improperly peeled and deveined;
> (c) Shrimp that were intentionally breaded so that the breading exceeded 50% of weight;
> (d) Shrimp that originated from a foreign source;
> (e) Shrimp that were otherwise unacceptable.

Other portions of the Indictment, which was returned on August 8, 1979, charge violations of the mail fraud statute, 18 U.S C. § 1341. The mailings alleged as an element of these offenses consist of invoices mailed from Defendant Treasure Isle to the United States Government, specifically, the Defense Personnel Support Center, and Treasury checks mailed to Defendant Treasure Isle from the United States Government. The Indictment also charges interstate transportation of property taken by fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 2314. The property involved in those counts are various Treasury checks mailed from the United States Government to the Defendant Treasure Isle. The Indictment also charges the Defendants with racketeering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1961 *et seq.*

Throughout the period of time covered by the Indictment, that is from approximately 1970 through July, 1978, the United States Government purchased large amounts of frozen breaded shrimp from the Defendant Treasure Isle under various contracts entered into by the United States and Treasure Isle. The United States Government continued to purchase shrimp from Treasure Isle until approximately the date that this Indictment was returned. Only a relatively small amount of the shrimp purchased by the Government from Treasure Isle is still in existence and available for inspection and testing by the Defendants in this case. Defendant G. Cecil Hartley filed a Motion in Limine, to Dismiss and to Suppress and a Supplemental Motion in Limine, to Dismiss and to Suppress which concern nonpreservation of shrimp by the Government and mishandling of shrimp which was preserved. The Motions, which have been joined in by all Defendants, contend that the Government has violated these Defendants' right to due process under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. The Motions assert that the Defendants were pre-

judiced by intentional pre-indictment delay, the prejudice being the unavailability of frozen breaded shrimp purchased from Treasure Isle by the Government for defense inspection and testing. It is further alleged that the continued consumption of shrimp by the United States Government during this period constitutes evidence of a purposeful and oppressive scheme to suppress and destroy material evidence in violation of the constitutional rights of the Defendants in this case. The Motions request dismissal of the Indictment, or, in the alternative, suppression of certain evidence relating to the shrimp which was tested. At a hearing held on the Motions immediately prior to commencement of the trial in this case, the Court announced that it would take the issue of dismissal of the Indictment on the ground of pre-indictment delay under advisement. However, the Motion to Suppress evidence based on Government destruction and mishandling of the shrimp was denied for the reasons set forth below.

As mentioned above, shrimp was purchased and consumed by the Department of Defense for consumption by military personnel throughout the period covered by the Indictment. During the latter years of this period the United States, through the Defense Investigative Service, was investigating certain alleged improprieties in connection with the in-plant inspection of frozen breaded shrimp which was being processed for sale to the Government. The investigation began in the latter part of 1976 but was closed in December of 1976. The investigation was reopened in the Spring of 1977, and its early stages was concerned with allegations of bribery of military inspectors. In December of 1977 the investigation began to focus on suspected outside subversion of the inspection process. (The details of this investigation and the results thereof were dealt with in the Court's Order on the Motion to Sup-

press dated April 2, 1980.) In January 1978, military inspectors at the Treasure Isle plant attempted to verify their suspicion that the inspection process was being subverted by employees of Treasure Isle. Certain steps were taken toward this end in connection with production lot nos. F6968 and F7008. After the inspectors' suspicions were verified to their satisfaction, the inspectors notified their superiors as to what they had found. Thereafter the shrimp which was produced under these two production lot numbers were shipped to various destinations pursuant to three separate Government contracts. The last four digits of those contracts were 5168, 5150, and 5153. Orders were given to place the shrimp from these lot numbers on hold for later testing. On two occasions during the early part of 1978 shrimp from these lot numbers were tested for compliance to Government specifications. A substantial portion of these lots were preserved and have been made available to the Defendants for testing. However due to subsequent thawing and refreezing, and normal deterioration, the shrimp from these two lots cannot be tested for some of the characteristics which are pertinent to this case, such as breading percentage and count per pound. All other shrimp produced by Treasure Isle and sold to the United States Government has been consumed, or in the words of the Defendants in this case, systematically destroyed.

In May, 1979, Defendant Hartley first learned that he was the object of a criminal investigation relating to the activities alleged in the Indictment, and, through his attorney contacted the prosecutor in this case. Defendant Hartley requested that recently produced shrimp be located and preserved to the extent that it could be at that time. *See* Hartley Exhibit No. 5. This request was refused by the Government. *See Hartley Exhibit No. 5A.* Prior to

the return of the Indictment, Defendant Hartley and his attorney did view, inspect, and test shrimp from the lots that had been put on hold by the Government at Norfolk, Virginia. The testing procedure which was mandated by the Government prosecutor at that time, however, was unacceptable to the Defendants. Thus when other shrimp was to be made available to them for testing at San Antonio, Texas, prior to the Indictment, Defendant Hartley refused the Government's offer.

II

In *Brady v. Maryland,* 373 U.S. 83 (1963) the Supreme Court established the basic principle that the prosecution has a duty to disclose evidence which is favorable to an accused upon request. Failure to do so may constitute a violation of the right to due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment irrespective of good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. *Id.* at 87. *See also Calley v. Callaway,* 519 F.2d 184, 221 (5th Cir. 1975) (*en banc*), *cert. denied,* 425 U.S. 911 (1976); *United States v. Gaston,* 608 F.2d 607 (5th Cir. 1979). A related problem arises when evidence in a criminal trial has been destroyed, or is otherwise unavailable due to conduct attributable to the prosecuting authorities. It has been held in this Circuit that as a matter of the fundamental fairness which is guaranteed by the due process clause of the fifth amendment a criminal defendant is entitled to access to relative and material evidence which is necessary for him to prepare his defense. *See Barnard v. Henderson,* 514 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1975). "Whether a Defendant has been deprived of this right of due process will depend upon the materiality of the evidence, the likelihood of mistaken interpretation of it by Government witnesses or the jury, and the reasons for its nonavailability to the defense."

United States v. Herndon, 536 F.2d 1027, 1029 (5th Cir. 1976).[1] If the evidence is material and there is a likelihood of mistaken interpretation of it by Government witnesses or the jury, the Court must determine whether the evidence was "critical" to the Defendant's ability to present his case. "Critical evidence" for the purpose of this inquiry, is evidence that, when developed by skilled counsel and experts, could induce a reasonable doubt in the minds of enough jurors to avoid a conviction. *See White v. Maggio,* 556 F.2d 1352, 1357-1358 (5th Cir. 1977).

The Court must agree with the Defendants in this case that the missing shrimp is both material and subject to varying expert opinion. While the consumption of the shrimp was "intentional", there is no evidence that there was an improper governmental motive in this case. The advisability of the continuing purchases of shrimp from Treasure Isle after January, 1978, may be questioned. However, once that shrimp was purchased it was not unreasonable for it to be consumed. The Government has stated no intention of introducing any results of tests performed on shrimp that was later consumed. While the Defendants are denied any potential benefits from tests which they may have performed, so to is the Government deprived of tests results which may have proven

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[1]In *Armstrong v. Collier,* 536 F.2d 72, 78 (5th Cir. 1976) the Court enunciated, without specifically adopting, the standard devised in the case of *United States v. Bryant,* 142 U.S. App.D.C. 132, 439 F.2d 642 (1971); in a lost evidence case the determination of whether the indictment should be dismissed is based on three factors: The degree of negligence or bad faith on the part of the Government, the importance of the evidence lost, and the evidence of guilt adduced at trial.

The First Circuit has devised a similar three pronged examination: first, was the evidence material to the question of guilt or the degree of punishment; second, was the Defendant prejudiced by its destruction; and third, was the Government acting in good faith when it destroyed the evidence. *United States v. Picariello,* 568 F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1978).

beneficial to their case. With regard to the shrimp that was preserved and allegedly mishandled by the Government, that being the shrimp contained in lots F6968 and F7008, the Court concludes that the Defendants have failed to sufficiently establish that there was intentional or even negligent conduct on the part of the Government agents which has caused the shrimp to be untestable for certain pertinent characteristics. Indeed the evidence at the hearing established that the mere passage of time would, to some extent, change the character and makeup of frozen breaded shrimp such that tests performed on it would be unreliable.

Thus, for the reasons set forth above the Court concludes that the consumption of shrimp purchased by the Government from Defendant Treasure Isle and the untestability of the shrimp that was preserved will not deprive these Defendants of a fundamentally fair trial. As stated by the Supreme Court, "Apart from trials conducted in violation of expressed constitutional mandates, a constitutionally unfair trial takes place only where the barriers and safeguards are so relaxed or fogotten that the proceeding is more a spectacle or trial by ordeal than a disciplined contest." *United States v. Augenblick,* 393 U.S. 348, 356 (1969) *(citations omitted).*

III

The Supreme Court in *United States v. Lovasco,* 431 U.S. 738 (1977) established that allegations of unconstitutional pre-indictment delay are to be judged against the standards of due process. In order to prevail on this ground a Defendant must show (1) substantial prejudice which resulted from the delay, and (2) that the delay was an intentional measure to gain a tactical advantage over the Defendant, or stated another way, that the prosecution

acted so as to violate "the fundamental conceptions of justice or the community's sense of fair play decency." *Id.* at 790, *quoting Rochin v. California,* 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952); *United States v. Parker,* 586 F.2d 422 (5th Cir. 1978). In attempting to establish substantial prejudice the Defendant may not rest on general or speculative allegations of prejudice. *See United States v. Duke,* 527 F.2d 386 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied,* 426 U.S. 952 (1976); *United States v. McGough,* 510 F.2d 598 (5th Cir. 1975). In addition, prosecution of a Defendant following investigative delay does not deprive him of due process despite the fact that his defense may have been somewhat prejudiced by the lapse of time. *United States v. Lovasco, supra,* at 796. Thus, if the Court determines that there has been some actual prejudice to the Defendants caused by the delay in bringing the Indictment, the Court must carefully evaluate the reasons offered by the Government to justify the delay to determine whether it was necessary for a legitimate prosecutorial purpose.

The period of delay which the Defendants complain of began in January, 1978, at which time the Government had gathered certain information concerning sample switching and other improprieties concerning the inspection of shrimp in the Treasure Isle plant. The details of the Government's knowledge at this time were recounted in the Order on the Motion to Suppress referred to above. The Indictment in this case was returned in August of 1979. Thus, according to the Defendants there was a period of nineteen months during which the prosecution delayed presenting facts known at that time to a Grand Jury for purposes of indicting these Defendants.

While assuming, without deciding, that the Defendants were substantially prejudiced by this period of delay, the Court finds no evidence of any effort by the prosecution

to gain a tactical advantage over the Defendants. The information that the Government was privy to in January of 1978 may have been sufficient to charge someone with something. The Government, however, chose to continue the investigation of activities at Treasure Isle which led to the present Indictment. As the trial of this case has clearly demonstrated the charges and the proof which has been presented to support those charges are complex. No one's interest would have been well served had the prosecution sought to initiate this case as soon as they were legally entitled to. *See United States v. Marion,* 404 U.S. 307, 325 (1971); *United States v. Lavasco, supra,* at 792-796.

In sum, the Court finds that the due process rights of these Defendants have not been violated by the lapse of time between the period of time covered by the Indictment and the time of the return of the Indictment. Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss based on this ground is DENIED.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this 11th day of June, 1980.

George L. Carr
United States District Judge

Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED
JAN 18 1983
ALEXANDER L. STEVAS
CLERK

No. 82-624

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1982

G. CECIL HARTLEY, and
TRAVIS DELL,

Petitioners,

vs.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

PETITIONERS' REPLY BRIEF

ARNOLD D. LEVINE, ESQUIRE
LEVINE, FREEDMAN, HIRSCH
& LEVINSON, P.A.
725 E. Kennedy Blvd.
Tampa, Florida 33602
813-229-6585

Attorneys for Petitioners
G. Cecil Hartley and
Travis Dell

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ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

PETITIONERS' REPLY BRIEF

Petitioners, G. CECIL HARTLEY and TRAVIS DELL,[1] pursuant to Rule 22.5 of this Court, respectfully file this brief in reply to the Brief for the United States in Opposition filed in this case on December 27, 1982.

Petitioners herein join in the Reply Brief filed by Treasure Isle, Inc. dated January 7, 1983.

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[1] As required by Rule 28.1 of this Court, Petitioners state that their corporate relationships as stated in their Petition for Writ of Certiorari are currently accurate.

In its brief, the Government on page 6, footnote 8, contends that the joinder by Petitioners in Treasure Isle's Petition "even if meritorious, would not impugn the validity of their convictions." The aforesaid statement in the Government's brief is not supported by any citation of authority or argument and as a matter of fact is inaccurate. The allegations of the RICO Count set forth "alleged facts" that are not otherwise set out in any other Count in the Indictment. The RICO Count was the vehicle under which the Court admitted a substantial amount of evidence that would not otherwise have been admissible under the other Counts of the Indictment. Accordingly, a determination that the RICO Count should have been dismissed and a corresponding determination of the exclusion of the evidence admitted by virtue of the existence of that Count would require reversal and remand for new trial on all Counts insofar as Petitioners herein, are concerned.

As it relates to the Petitions filed in behalf of Hartley and Dell, the Government contends that their "claims are without factual or legal merit." (Br. in Opp., at 10). Petitioners submit that these contentions are misleading. In support of Petitioners' contentions they submit the following:

WHAT DID THE GOVERNMENT DO?

1. Since before 1970 the Government contracted with Treasure Isle to purchase frozen, breaded shrimp.

2. The Government contract furnished the specifications that set out the criteria for the quality of the product acceptable to the Government and the criteria for establishing the price for said product. Different prices were charged by Treasure Isle for different sizes, with the larger shrimp being the most expensive. The only criteria for setting of the price was size.

3. The shrimp were inspected in-plant by military inspectors.

4. In December, 1977, the Government became concerned that the in-plant inspection process was being subverted and that as a consequence it was not receiving the quality of shrimp called for in the contract and was paying for large shrimp, when as a matter of fact it was receiving small shrimp.

5. The production of frozen, breaded shrimp sold to the military was on a continuous basis, but for the purposes of identification the production was broken into lot numbers. In December of 1977 the in-plant military inspectors specially marked boxes from lots F-6869 and F-7008, so that when that product was received at a military installation a determination could be made whether or not the inspection process had been subverted.

6. When the shipment including lots F-6968 and F-7008 reached its destination, the Department of Investigative Services, the Criminal Investigative Agency for the Department of Defense, took charge of the product and had it inspected to determine whether it satisfied the contract specifications. The two lots were tested and re-tested five or six times over the next six months with varying results. The Government ultimately contended that the product was non-conforming in regard to size (count per pound) and percentage of breading and certain other attributes.

7. The Government continued to purchase frozen, breaded shrimp from Treasure Isle through approximately July, 1979.

8. As a part of the continuing criminal investigation by the Government, the Department of Investigative Services in January and April, 1979 tested Treasure Isle's product at a

military installation and found that the product conformed to the contract in all respects. This product was produced under the same conditions as the product in lots F-6968 and F-7008.

9. In mid-1979, Treasure Isle learned that it was the subject of a criminal investigation, and a written demand was made upon the Government in June, 1979 to preserve all Treasure Isle product on hand in order to permit it to be independently tested. In June, 1979 the Government had thousands of pounds of Treasure Isle product on hand.

10. Unbeknownst to Petitioners and Treasure Isle, the Government consummed all of the product that had been on hand in June, 1979 (and thereafter purchased), except for the product in lots F-6968 and F-7008.

11. The Government mishandled the frozen breaded shrimp that were a part of lots F-6968 and F-7008 by repeatedly allowing the product to thaw and thereafter refreezing it. As a consequence, the product could not be independently tested for size, breading percentage and certain other characteristics that the Government claimed constituted evidence of the fraud perpetrated upon it.

12. The Government offered Treasure Isle the opportunity to test lots F-6968 and F-7008 after the product had been mishandled, which offer was rejected since testing at that point would have served absolutely no purpose.

WHAT DID THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE DO?

1. The Department of Justice controlled and directed the criminal investigation of Treasure Isle from its inception through the date of the return of the Indictment.

2. A special attorney employed by the Department of

Justice made the Grand Jury presentation, and prepared the indictment returned by the Grand Jury.

3. The special attorney employed by the Department of Justice received Treasure Isle's June 1979 letter requesting that the product on hand be retained for the purpose of testing and *took no action* in response to that request.

4. The special attorney with the Department of Justice acted as lead counsel during the trial of Petitioners.

WHAT DID THE TRIAL JUDGE DO?

1. The Trial Judge denied Petitioners' Motion to Dismiss, Suppress and in Limine by virtue of which Petitioners sought to exclude the Government's presentation of its test results of F-6968 and F-7008. The Court found that:

> ". . . a substantial portion of these lots were preserved and have been made available to the Defendants for testing. However, due to subsequent thawing and refreezing, and normal deterioration, the shrimp from these two lots cannot be tested for some of the characteristics which are pertinent to this case, such as, breading percentage and count per pound. All other shrimp produced by Treasure Isle and sold to the United States Government has been consumed or, in the words of the Defendants in this case, systematically destroyed . . ."
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> "The Court must agree with Petitioners in this case that the *missing shrimp is both material and subject to varying expert opinion.* While the consumption of the shrimp was 'intentional,' there is no evidence that there was an improper governmental motive in this case . . ." (Emphasis added)

2. Over objection, the Trial Judge permitted the Government to present to the jury the results of its testing of lots F-6968 and F-7008.

3. The Trial Judge permitted the Government to impeach the military inspectors who had tested the Treasure Isle product and determined that it conformed to the contract specifications. That product was consumed by the Government after the testing was completed, and therefore was unavailable for independent testing by Treasure Isle.

WHAT DID THE JURY DO?

1. After a day and one-half of deliberations, the jury sent a note to the Trial Judge stating that it was *"hopelessly deadlocked"* and could not reach a verdict (LXXVI, p. 7964). The note further explained that a portion of the jury *"rejects all prosecution testimony as untrue"* and *"a fabric of lies"* (LXXVI, p. 7964).

2. The jury ultimately convicted Petitioners and Treasure Isle of all counts charged in the Indictment.

WHAT DID THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS DO?

1. In the opinion affirming the Petitioners' convictions, the Eleventh Circuit required that the Defendants prove the Government's *"bad faith"* and its *"improper motive"* when the Government has mishandled, lost, consumed or destroyed material evidence, before the Court would grant relief from a verdict of guilty.

WHAT CONTENTIONS HAS THE SOLICITOR GENERAL MADE?

1. Insofar as the RICO Count set out in the Indictment is concerned, he contends that the Department of Justice did nothing wrong but that it will never again charge a corporation as a Defendant and as the "enterprise" within the meaning of RICO.

2. He contends that Petitioners Hartley and Dell were not prejudiced by the "improper" RICO charge in the Indictment.

3. He contends that Petitioners' claims "are without factual or legal merit." In footnote 15, page 13 (Br. Opp.) he contends that Petitioners failed to distinguish or even cite the case of *United States v. Augenblick*, 393 U.S. 348, 355-356 (1969) and that Petitioners' reliance on *Brady v. Maryland*, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) is misplaced.

ARGUMENT

Nowhere in the Government's Brief in Opposition are the conflicts that exist among the First, Second, Third, Fifth, Ninth, D.C. and Eleventh Circuits addressed. As a matter of fact, the cases cited by the Government on pages 13 and 14 in its Brief in Opposition clearly show that the conflicting appellate opinions also include one from the Tenth Circuit. *United States v. Baca*, 687 F.2d 1356 (10th Cir. 1982).

The First Circuit places the *burden of showing good faith on the Government rather than on the Defendant. United States v. Picariello*, 568 F.2d 22 (1st Cir. 1978).

In the Second Circuit there are two tests: *one that weighs the Government's culpability against the amount of prejudice to the Defendant, United States v. Miranda*, 526 F.2d 1319 (2nd Cir. 1975), and the second which *directs that sanctions will nor-*

mally flow against the Government irrespective of its motivations "unless the Government can bear the heavy burden of demonstrating that no prejudice resulted to the Defendant." United States v. Bufalino, 576 F.2d 446 (2nd Cir. 1978).

The Third Circuit holds that *"convictions may be permitted to stand only so long as the Government has made 'earnest efforts' to preserve crucial materials . . ."* and when the Government can show that *the loss was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Government of Virgin Islands v. Testamark*, 570 F.2d 1162, 1165, 1167 (3rd Cir. 1978).

The Fifth Circuit, using an analogy drawn from the line of cases following *Brady v. Maryland*, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194 (1963), applied a constitutional due process standard and equated intentional non-preservation of evidence with illegal suppression. The Court required that the Government establish its earnest efforts to preserve the evidence, and it concluded that good faith on the part of the Government would excuse the loss of evidence. *White v. Maggio*, 556 F.2d 1352 (5th Cir. 1977). The Court cautioned that *"an exception for good faith loss of important evidence must not be allowed to swallow the discovery rules, and the burden of explanation of the Government must be a heavy one." Armstrong v. Collier*, 536 F.2d 72, 78 (5th Cir. 1976).

The test applicable to lost or destroyed evidence in the Ninth Circuit requires *a Defendant to show the Government's bad faith or that he was prejudiced before a conviction can be overturned. United States v. Heiden*, 508 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1974). This position seems to have been reiterated in *United States v. Loudhawk*, 628 F.2d 1139, 1146 (9th Cir. 1979).

In the D.C. Circuit the Court will only apply the *"good faith exception"* in circumstances when the *Government has employed rigorous and systematic procedures designed to*

preserve all discoverable evidence." United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971), and *United States v. Bryant*, 448 F.2d 1182 (D.C. Cir. 1971).

The Eleventh Circuit in *United States v. G. Cecil Hartley, et al.*, 678 F.2d 961 (11th Cir. 1982), *required the Defendant to prove the Government's bad faith and/or improper motive*, before it would consider the loss or destruction of evidence a Due Process violation sufficient to warrant reversal.

In the Tenth Circuit the Court seems to require a showing of bad faith or fraudulent purpose on the part of the Government before it will reverse a conviction. *United States v. Buca*, 687 F.2d 1356. In that case federal authorities did not destroy or participate in the destruction of the evidence; therefore, the Court did not deal with the question of who has the burden of proving the Government's impropriety and/or good faith.

Some of the cases cited rely upon *Brady*, supra, and its progeny and others rely upon the test set out in *United States v. Augenblick*, 393 U.S. 348, 89 S.Ct. 528 (1969). In the later case this Court noted that "the Government bore the burden of producing (the tapes) or explaining why it could not do so." *Id.* at 355-56. This Court has *never* required a *Defendant* to prove the Government's "bad faith" or "improper motive" when the Government has mishandled, lost, consumed or destroyed material evidence as is now required by the Eleventh Circuit. *United States v. Hartley, supra.*

CONCLUSION

There are sound legal reasons why this Court should exercise its discretion and grant certiorari to resolve the conflicts between the Federal Appellate Courts relating to: (1) who has the burden to establish the Government's good faith or bad faith and/or improper motive; (2) who has the burden to prove the

materiality of the lost or destroyed evidence; (3) who has the burden to prove whether a Defendant has been prejudiced, and what degree of prejudice must be established to warrant reversal of a conviction; (4) the extent to which the Defendant's right to test material evidence which has been lost or destroyed by the Government is protected by the due process clause of the Constitution; (5) the sanctions, if any, to be imposed on the Government when it has lost or destroyed material evidence that precludes a Defendant from independently testing that evidence; and (6) who has the burden of proving whether the Government has made an earnest effort to preserve material evidence.

LEVINE, FREEDMAN, HIRSCH
& LEVINSON
Professional Association

BY: _____

Arnold D. Levine, Esquire
725 E. Kennedy Boulevard
Tampa, Florida 33602
(813) 229-6585
Attorneys for Petitioners

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